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DJ C:CT ~; J. _23~_5_-D 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. R. \V ALKI£R, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRACY LOA.'J & rrRJUSrr COM-
pANY, a corporation, as re-
eeiver for \VALKER BROTH-
ERS DRY GOODS COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Drfendcmt and Appellant. 
Case No. 5338 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM rrHIRD JUDIOIAL DISTRICT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
\Valker Brothers Dry Goods, a Utah corporation, 
operated a large retail department store in Salt Lake 
City for nearly two generations. It was one of the oldest 
and leading mercantile establishments of the western 
section of the United States, and had been owned by the 
Walker family until November, 1928 (Abstract 71; Ren-
shaw rrrauscript 53) ·when E. F. Dreyfous aequired stoek 
control. The plaintiff, J. H. Walker, was elected Pres.i-
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dent and director in 1903 (Ahs. 25; Trans. 30) and oc-
cupied those positions even after the control of the cor-
poration passed to Dreyfous (Abs. 35; Trans. :38). From 
1903 to November, 1928 he was the active head of the 
business, but after that date, Dreyfous completely or-
dered its destinies (Abs. :-~5; 'l'rans. :~9) and the plain-
tiff Walker, was ''only a figure head.'' 
Following the entry of Dreyfous into the corpora-
tion, the store building of the oompany in Salt Lake City 
was remodeled at an expenditure of $320,000.00 (Abs. 
35; Tmns. 39). Finall(:ial diflicul ties followed which 
resulted in the appointment of Tracy Loan & Trust Com-
pany, a eorporation, as equity receiver for the company 
and its properties by the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County on .June 
25, 1930. 'l'he receiver qualified aml immediately entered 
into possession of the assets and business of the com-
pany aml for a temporary period continued the opera-
tion of the department store business. 
At least twenty-five years prior to the receivership, 
the company established a practice of encouraging its 
empLoyees to "deposit" their surplus funds or savings 
with the company (Abs. 55; Trans. Renshaw 41). These 
funds were repayable on demand (Abs. 33; Trans. 36) 
and the company paid 6jr. interest per annum (com-
pounded semi-annual1ly) (Ahs. 44; Trans. 30). The "de-
posits" were evidenced by a small hook which simply 
bore the imprint "vValker Brothers Dry Goods Co." 
(Renshaw Exhibits A and B). No rules or regulations 
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~overing the :so-called deposits were printed in the book 
nor is there any evidence that any regulations ever ex-
isted, except a general understanding of the agreement 
of the company. ln 1929 these "deposits" amounted 
in total to about $41,000.00 (Ab:s. 5G; Renshaw Trans. 
41 ). lu 1924 they amounted to $G0,514.55 (Abs. 30; 
Trans. :35). For years the company paid or credited the 
earned interest on the respective aceounts of the em-
ployees (Abs. G9; Renshaw 'l1 rans. 5:3). 'rhe funds were 
"wi thdra wablc" on demand of an employee ( AJbs. 44; 
Renshaw Trans. 30). (Abs. 33; Trans. 36). 
After Dreyfous acquired contro'l of the business 
these so-called "Jeposits" were reduced by "repay-
ment" to the "depositors". \Vhen the receiver was ap-
vointed the t,otal of such "deposits" amounted only to 
$11,778.78, exelusive of the sum of $2909.85, which latter 
<mwunt is involved in this action (Abs. 68 and 69; Ren-
:,haw Trans. 52) as hereinafter set forth. It also ap-
pears that the company employees from time to time 
received verbal assurances from the control accountant 
of the c·ompany that their funds on deposit were "abso-
lutely safe and if anything ever happened to the store, 
they would be paid in preferenee to any one'' ( Abs. 44; 
Henshaw Trans. 30; Abs. 73; Renshaw Trans. 56). The 
aecountaut elaims to have given these assurances to the 
employees at the instance and under the orders of the 
}Jlainti ff, Walker, when he was manager of the business 
and that Dreyfons, after he became manager, also di-
rected that she inform the employ(•es to the same effect. 
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(Abs. 50; Renshaw Trans. 34). However, there was no 
written agreement entered into by the company erecting 
any specific trust fund protecting these "deposits'' of 
the employees, nor attempting to make the "deposits" 
preferred claims in event of insolvency of the company. 
The employees "deposited" their funds from time 
to time and in each book, which was held by the em-
ployee, the amount of the "deposit" was acknowledge<l. 
Interest credits were shown in like manner in the hooks 
(Renshaw case Exhibits A ancl B). The funds were 
received from the employees by the company at its reg-
ular cashier's ~window or were paid to the eontrol a(~­
countant at her desk (Ahs. 52 and 53; Renshaw Trans. 
37, 38 and i39). The "deposits" were never ear-marked. 
(Abs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40). The company main-
tained comme.rcial bank ace.ounts in several of the Salt 
Lake City banks (A!hs. 53; Renshaw Trans. 38) and 
funds of the company received in the operation of its 
large business ancl the employee ''deposits'' were de-
posited in these banks. (Abs. 53; R,enshaw Trans. 38). 
In making these bank deposits there was no distinction 
made as to funds received from the employees on ''de-
posit'' and the funds representing general income from 
business operations. (Abs. 53 awl 54; Renshaw Trans. 
38, 39 and 40). All money that was, received at the store 
of the company was deposited without distinction as to 
its souree. Employees "deposits" were intermingled 
with general income and deposited (Ahs. 63 and 64; 
R.enshaw 'rrans. 47, 48, 49) in the eommercial banks. 
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'rhe obligations of the company were paid out of the 
eommercial bank deposits of the company. There was 
no speeial bank account representing only the funds of 
employees "deposited with the company, and when an 
employee desired to ''withdraw'' funds from the com-
pany, he was paid by check drawn on any one of the 
l)aukiug depositm·ies of the company. No special bank 
aeeomtt was used for this purpose (Abs. 64; Renshaw 
Trans. 48 and 49). There was a complete intermingling 
and confusion of the employees "deposits" with the 
general funds of the corporation. (Abs. 57; Renshaw 
Traw.;. 42) ( Ahs. 64; Renshaw Trans. 48). 
I~arly in the Walker administration of the eompany 
the eorpora tion books showed these employees "depos-
its" as a liability under the title of "On deposit" (Abs. 
47; Renshaw Trans. 3B). A certified a.eeountant ques-
tioned the practice as partaking of the nature of a bank-
ing business, whereupon the ledger account caption was 
c:haugecl to ''Cash due J<Jrnployees' '. On the balance 
sheets of the company the amount due all of the em-
ployees was always shown as a liability, and it was 
11ever represented as a trust fund or a preferred claim 
(Abs. 27; Trans. i~2; Abs. 62; Renshaw Trans. 47). Dur-
ing the Dreyfous administration the practice remained 
the smue, exeept that there was an individualization of 
the aecounts instead of carrying but one aecount in the 
general accounting· set of the company. ( A>bstract Gl; 
Henshaw Trans. 45). 
The company, for years, placed its surplus funrls 
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in time certificates of deposits issued and negotiated by 
the cornmoreial banks with which it did business. (Abs. 
31, Trans. :~5; Abs. 4:8, Renshaw rrrans. 34). When the 
credit balances in favor of tho company at a particular 
bank accumulated beyond a certain point, a time cer-
tificate of deposit would be secured (Abs. 54; Renshaw 
rrrans. 40; Ahs. 58, Renshaw rrrans. 4:~; Abs. ;)9, Ren-
shaw Trans. 4:3) from the bank. These time deposit cer-
tificates were for six or twelve months (Abs. 58; Rensha\\' 
rPrans. 4i3), and they represented excess emmergeney 
funds of the f~ompany (Ahs. 51; Rensha1v Trans. 3G). 
They represented at 011e time a sum greatly in excess 
of the company's lia hili ty to its employees for their 
so-called "deposits" (Abs. 58; Renshaw Trans. 43). In 
1924 at the time of the eompany audit, the employees 
"savings accounts" carried a liability of $()0,514.55 
( Abs. 30; Trans. :14). The company had time deposits 
of $42,47G.OO ( Abs. 31 ; rrrans. :~5) a cashier's cheek of 
$10,000.00 and a speeial hank account of $17,083.85. 
These represented a reserve "to take eare of any emer-
gency" (Abs. 33; Trans. 36). 
In pur(~hasiug these time eerti{icates of deposit tl:e 
eompany did not ear-mark funds received from its em-
ployees as savings or "on deposit" and buy a special 
certificate of deposit with such funds (Ahs. 54; Ren-
shaw Trans. 40). Such funds went into the company',:; 
general bank aceounts indiscriminately, along with otlw: 
funds of the company ( Abs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40), nnd 
wheu the balance at auy hank accumulated to a point 
,.. 
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as to permit the purchase of a time certificate, the cer-
tificate was acquired. (Ahs. 54; Renshaw Trans. 40). 
'fhe certificates eanied no indication on their face that 
tlwy \\"ere for any particular purpose. At the time of 
Uw appointment of the receiver, no time certificates in 
favor of the company existed (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans. 
44). They had he en previously cashed and the proceeds 
used hy the corporation in its business. 
Alice Prye, (also known as Mrs. Alice Young) had 
for years been employed as a domestic servant in the 
home of the plaintiff, Walker. She was never an em-
ployee of vValker Brothers Dry Goods Company. (Abs. 
19, Trans. 25 and 26; Abs. 20, Trans. 26; Abs. 34, Trans. 
:37). The plaintiff with her consent, placed her savings 
on "rleposit" with ~Walker Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pauy in the same manner as if Alice Frye had been au 
employee of the company. (Abs. 19, Trans. 25; Abs. 34, 
'l'rans. 37 ancl38). 'rhe account was built up on a similar 
plan as the accounts of the company employees. (Abs. 
19, 'l'ram;. 25; Abs. 27, 'rrans. 32). In May 1930 ( Abs. 
20, 'rrans. 26; Abs. 34, Trans. 38) and while plaintiff 
was president and director of the company, he made 
settlement with Alice Frye and she assigned her claim 
against the eompany a rising out of the "deposit" of 
her funds, to the plaintiff (Abs. i34; Trans. 38). The 
<'redit balance in favor of Alice Fry at this time ap-
!Jroximated the sum of $5,909.85. 
The wife of plaintiff at this time was indebted to 
the eompany on au open account in the approximate 
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amount of $3000.00. (Abs. 18, Trans. 24; Abs. 34, Trans. 
~~8). V{hen the plaintiff had acquired from Alice Frye 
her right and title to the "deposit" claim he went to 
the control accountant of the company (in May 1930) 
<:md ordered her to transfer a sufficient amount from 
the Alice Frye account to pay aud settle the liability 
of his wife on her account due the company and to hold 
the balance to his credit ·with authority for his wife 
to purdwse merchandise against it. (Abs. 18, 'J1rans. 
24; Abs. 2:3, Trans. 28 awl 2~); Ab:,;. 24, Trans. 29; Abs. 
34, Trans. 38). The control accountant transferred ap-
proximately $3000.00 from the "B1 rye account (then o-vmed 
l)y plaintiff) to the credit of the account of Mrs .• J. R. 
"\Valker, plaintiff's wife. '11his paid this aceount in full 
(Abs. 18, Trans. 24). Upon this transfer being effected 
there remained a balance of $2,9mJ.85 to the credit of 
the plaintiff as assignee of Alice 11-,rye. Thereafter and 
prior t.o the appointment of the receiver for the com-
pauy, the wife of plaintiff heemne indebted to the com-
pany in the sum of $329.98 for merchandise purehased 
ty her. After the appointment of the receiver, the wife 
of plaintiff became indebted to the receiver in the addi-
tional sum of $2,006.03. llowever, it was stipulated by 
eounsel and found l>y tbe trial court (Abs. 79; Trans. 11) 
that the defendant a:,; rec-eiver, had sold to a third per-
E>on the accounts against plaintiff's wife and therefore 
the question of offsetting the total amount due from 
plaintiff's wi ft~ to the receivership estate against plain-
tiff's claim harl been eliminated from the case (Abs. 79; 
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rr'rans. 11 ). No further consideration need be g1ven to 
this question of offsets. 
~\ftcr the appointrne11t of defendant as receiver of 
Walker Br.others Dry Goods Company, the plaintiff filed 
his proof of claim with the said receiver within the tim0 
ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the receiver-
:ship proceedings. Plaintiff in his proof of claim al-
leged that his claim was preferred and entitled to full 
payment before the common creditors of the insolvent 
eorporatiou were entitled to participate in a distribution 
uf the receivership assets. The defendant receiver re-
fused to allow the claim as a preferred claim but ap-
proved same as a common claim without preference. 
']'hereupon the court in which the receivership proceed-
ings were and are pending- ordered plaintiff to institute 
Dnd prosecute a plenary aetion against the defendant 
receiver to determine if a preference existed in favor of 
plaintiff which would entitle him to full payment of his 
claim before common creditors of the receivership estate 
\','Onlrl be entitled to participate. This present action is 
the plenary action ordered by the court. 
f11 the receivership proceedings the court ordered 
the defendant reeeiver to set up a reserve of cash funds 
of $11,268.33 to protect the creditors of the receivership 
estate who are employee "depositors" as herein desig-
llah~d and desc~ribed, in the event it was finally deter-
miner} they were entitled to payment of their claims in 
full. The cond further directed the receiver to pay to 
these creditors claiming preference the same dividends 
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as were paid common creditors as and when such divi-
dends were paid, without prejudice as to either the re-
ceiver or creditors claiming preference. The receiver 
!1as earrietl out the order of the t'ourt in all respeets. The 
reserve fund has been ere a ted and the employee "depos-
itors" have been paid dividends in the same proportion 
as paid common ereditors. (Abs. 77; rrrans. 9). 
The trial eourt in this action found that the assets 
of \V alker Brothers Dlry Goods Company are immilicient 
to pay the general creditors more than approximately 
55,j{ of the amount of such claims allowed by the re-
ceiVer. (Finding XIII, Abstraet 80, Trans. 11). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ARGUMENT. 
I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OR 
PRIORITY IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS CLAIM BY 
THE DEFENDANT RECEIVER, BECAUSE (a) THE 
TRANSACTION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF A N D 
WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY IN-
VOLVING THE ALICE FRYE ACCOUNT DID NOT 
CHANGE A DEBTOR AND CREDITOR RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND THE COMPANY 
INTO THAT OF TRUSTEE AND CESTUI QUE 
TRUST; AND (b) THE SilVIPLE CONTRACT DEBT 
DUE PLAINTU'F, AS ASSIGNEE OF ALICE FRYE 
WAS NOT CONVERTED INTO A TRUST FUND. 
Appellant's AssigumelllR or ETror Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
b (a), 9, 10, (a and c), and 11 involve the foregoing propo-
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tlition. Therefore, as a matter .of convenience they may 
1Je discussed together. Assignments 2, 3 and 9 are di-
rected against Finding of Fact VI, which is as follows: 
'"rhat vrior to the appointment of the de-
fendant, as receiver of "Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company, as aforesaid, the plaintiff deliv-
ered to and deposited with tlle said 'Walker Broth-
ers Dry Goods Gomprany the sum of $2,909.85, 
upon an express trust, to-wit: that said sum he 
held and retained by the said 'Valker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company f.or the sole, specific and spe-
rial purpose, and that only, of securing the pay-
ment of and paying for the future goods, wares 
and merchandise to be pun·hased hy the wife of 
plaintiff from \V alker Brothers Dry Goods 
store.'' 
Assignments 4 and 5 are directed against Finding 
of Fact VII, which is as follows: 
"That the said deposit so made by the plain-
tiff to 'V alker Br.othen; Dry Goods Company un-
<ler the express trust, as aforesaid, \vas accepted 
and held by 'Walker Brothen; Dry Goo<h; Com, 
pany in trust as a special fund or deposit for the 
:-;pecific use and purpose for which it was entrust-
ed to the said 'V alker Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pany, to-wit; for the security, satisfaction and 
payment of future advances and sales of goods, 
wares and merchandise l>v Walker Brothers Drv 
Goods store to the wife or" plaintiff, and not othm:-
wise." 
As to each of said Findings, the Appellant asserts 
that (a) the trial conrt ened in making the Finding as 
D~ matter of law; and (b) that the evidence in the case is 
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wholly iusnffh::ientt to support both or either of said 
Findings. 
Assigmnents 1, 10 (a and e), and 11 each rmse the 
question as to whether or not a trust relationship existed 
between plaintiff and ~Walker Brothers Dry Goods Com-
pany and also as to whether or not there existed a trust 
fund or res. 
1. ALICE J<'RYE WAS A SIMPLE CONTRACT CREDrTOit OF 
1VALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMl'AN L PLAINTIFF AS HEU 
ASSIGNEE, SUCCEEDBD TO HE!t RIGHTS AND ASSUMED HER 
LEGAL STATUS IN REGAHD TO '1'1-LE FUNDS LOANED BY HER TO 
THE COMPANY. 
'l'he plaintiff on cross-examination was asked: 
"Q. Now, I will ask yon to state whether 
or not this account of l\lrs. Young's or Miss 
Frye's was transferred to you 'q" (Abs. 34; Tram;, 
37). 
Plaintiff's answer to this question was as follows: 
''A. I had for years and years back, she 
was our old nurse g·irl, a1H1 I had the handling of 
this fund, had it long hefore I put it in the store. 
I put it in there, I ~was trustee, and in my last 
vear I had ]\Irs. Chase tram;fer it to mv account. 
I didn't want to involve her in any re~~eivership 
proceeding-s. I was taking eare of this fund for 
her. 1 told l\lr.s. Chase to transfer it to mv ae-
count aml apply enoug·h to clean up Mrs. Walker'.;; 
account and 1 would leave the balance there for her 
account. She was in the habit of running au ac-
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eount of two or three thousaml dollars a year. I 
couhl have drawn it out if I had wanted to." 
In this testimony is found the origiu of the claim 
whieh is the basis of this action. The testimony of con. 
trol accountant, Chase, (Abs. 19 and 20; Trans. 25 and 
26) throws further light on Alice ]'rye's relation to 
the plaintiff and to the eompany. 
'' Q. Do you kno\Y, Mrs. Chase, when this 
Alice :B'rye aceount was opened"? 
A. It nmst have been before I had the books, 
I never received any deposits. 
Q. 
person~ 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Alice Frye and Aliee Young are the same 
y,es sir. 
Do you know who that lady was? 
I never seen (sic) her. 
Do you know who she was'? 
A. I knew there was such a person. 
Q. She was employed in the home of Mr. 
Walker~ 
A. 
Q. 
Ye-s, sir. 
As a domes tie servant? 
A. Ye-s, sir. 
Q. Did you ever aceept any money direet 
from Mrs. Frye rg 
A. No. 
Q. How was Illoue.Y brought there to the 
credit of her a'ccounto? 
A. Mr. ·walker ahn1ys hl'ougUt it to the 
store. J don't think I ever di(l reecivc anv moneY 
on it myself. I used to /i[;ure the inter-Psf. · 
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(~. You never saw Miss J1'rye or .i\lrs. 
Young"? 
A. I never saw her." 
It is obvious from the foregoing eviumwe that Alice 
Frye was never an employee of the company. She was 
a domestic servant in \Yalker 's home. 'l'he funds de-
livered to the company by ~Walker belonged to Miss Frye 
auu credit was given by the company to her. 'rhe ac-
count stood in the name of Ali('e Frye. She was recog-
nized by the company as the principal and with regard 
to the handling of her money \V alker was her agent in 
dealing with the company. Until Alice J1'rye assigned 
her claim to \Valker, the <'ompany knew only her as tlw 
owner of the claim. Thi! eontraet was between the com-
pany and Miss F'rye. No matter what \Valker may ues-
ig1wte the legal status he individually occupied towards 
Miss Frye iu regard io her funus, as between the com· 
pany and Miss Frye the relation was simply of that o l' 
debtor and creditor. She, acting through her ag·eut, 
Walker, loaNed the money to the eorporatimJ. On thu 
company there rested the contract duty of paying in-
terest on the borrowed funds, awl repayment of princi-
pal to her on her demand. There was no duty to \Valker. 
"It is also elementary law that the principal 
is entitled to tl1e benefit of a eoutraet made in 
his name by au authorized agent." 
Hartford Distillery Co. v. N. Y. N. H. R. 
Co., 115 Atl. (Conn.) 488; 
Savage vs. Hix, ~) New Ilampshirc 2G:3; 
Stone vs. \V ood, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 453; 
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~lerchants Bank vs. Hayes, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 
530. 
'l'he fundamentals of the transactions between Miss 
Frye and the company dearly demonstrate that she 
loaned her funds to the company and the company bor-
rowed the same from her. 'l'he company agreed to pay 
her interest alHJ did in truth pay intereRt (Abs. 20; 
Trans. 2G) for the use of her funds. There can be no 
trust relationship deduced from this agreement to pay 
interest. In truth the agreement to pay interest connotes 
u debt-not a trust fund. ''If a marn pays interest for 
money he must be entdled to the •use of it. When a rnmt 
locks np 'money which is intrusted to him in a box, he 
does twt pay interest O'n it." In re BToad 13 Qu,eens 
Hench J)·inision 740. Miss Frye occupied no different 
position towards the company than that of the numerous 
hank creditorR, which loaned their fnnds to the com-
pany in consideration of the payment of interest. She 
was a stranger to the company and the company bor-
rowed call money from her. ''Interest is the compensa. 
tir!ll paid for the use of money. It is allowed on the 
grou-nd of some contm.ct, exp1·ess or iutplied, to pay d, 
or as dwma.rJeS fo1· the breach of some contract, or the 
violat,io'n of some duty." Arizona Eastern R. Co. v. 
Head, 26 Arizona 259; 224 Pnc. 1057. "Interest is the 
compensation allowe-d by law, or fixed by the pa1·ties, 
for the use or forebeat·a11,ce of money, or as da,ma,ges fo•r 
-its detention,." 15 R. C. L. See. 1, page 3. 
The agreement of the company to pay Miss Frye 
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interest on her advances to the company, plainly stamps 
the transaction at:J one between debtor and creditor. Up-
on receipt of her funds the company could do what i: 
desired with them. It was not to invest them in a trust 
fund for her benefit and then pay her interest on them. 
It was intended that it use them in the company business 
~ud pay her interest for such use of her money. There-
fore, up to the point when \\' alker paid Miss I<-, rye the 
amount of her claim and in return secured her assign-
ment thereof, the corporation was but a simple con-
tract debtor of Miss Frye. She was a simple contraez 
creditor. Walker sueceeded to her legal rights and as-
:,umed her legal position. 
2. WALKER's TRANSACTION WTTH MHS. CHASE, CONTROL 
ACCOUNTANT OF THE CORPORATION, DID NOT CONVERT THE 
BALANCE OF THE SIMPLE CONTltACT INDEBTEDNESS FORMERLY 
OWED BY THE COHPORATION TO MISS FRYE AND THEN OWED 
TO \VALKER, INTO A TltUST FUND, NOH DID IT MAKE THE COR-
PORATION TRUSTEE OF THE BALANCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS. 
Walker in his testimony quoted above (Abs. 34; 
Trans. 37) and found on page 12 of this brief, gives us 
his version of the transaction with Mrs. Clbase, the com-
pany employee who had charge of these employee loan 
uccounts. Mrs. Chase furnishes correlative evidence on 
the same subjed (Abs. 18; 'l'rans. 24 and 25): 
"A. At this time Mr. \Valker asked me to 
trant:Jfer tlw aecount of Ali<'(~ Young Fry(~ from 
her savings a(~Colmt to pay the account of Mrs. 
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.T. R. .\Valker and it left a balance of two thousand 
dollars, somewhere around that. He said Mrs. 
\Valker would he charging more merchandise and 
we would use that to pay the account, use this two 
thousand to pay the account when her account 
was that amount." 
Q. As I understand it, this Frye account 
was applied first to the payment of the indebted-
Hess then owing the company by Mrs. \Valker. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. That was some three thousand dollars. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And that left a balance'? 
A. Left a balance of somewhere around two 
thousand dollars. 
Q. It was with reference to that balance, Mr. 
Walker told you to hold it and apply it on the 
future purchases of 1\lrs. Walker, was it? 
A. Yes sir." 
\Yhen Walker seeured his assignment from Miss 
Frye, after paying to her the amount of her claim against 
1lw <~orporation, the Fry account was approximately 
$3,~Jml.8i). 1\lrs .• J. H. ·walker owed the corporation about 
$:3000.00 011 an open account for merchandise sold and 
delivered to her. This debt due from Mrs. Walker, was 
paid in full by transferring approximately $3000.00 from 
the Fry account to the credit of this Mrs. J. R. \Valker 
aeeount. 'l'he balance of the Frye account (then owned 
hy Walker) after this trau:,;fer, wa:,; $2,909.85 and it is 
this balance which is the subject of this action. Ae-
cor<ling to Walker, he tohl Mrs. Chase "to transfer it 
(the Frye account) to my account and apply enough to 
18 
dean up .Mrs. vValker 's account and leave the balance 
there for her account." Mrt-1. Chase states that Walker 
said: "Mrs. vValker would be charging more merchandise 
and we would use that (the balance of $2,909.85) to pay 
the account, UHe this two thousand to pay the account 
when her account was that amount.'' 
It is upon this transaction and conversation that 
the plaintiff must rest his case that a trust ·was created 
It will be noted that the plaintiff paid no funds to the 
company. He and Mrs. Chase dealt only with the bal-
ance of the Frye account. Was this balance of the Frye 
account ($2,909.85) transfonned from a simple contract 
debt into a trust fund? In order to entitle plaintiff to 
payment in full there must be found in this transaction 
all of the elementH necessary to nHtablish a trust rela-
tionship between ·walker and the company. \Ve have 
demonstrated that the relationship between plaintiff'~" 
r,ssignor, Miss Frye, and the company, was that of debtor 
and creditor and that \V alker, as her assignee assumed 
the same position. When he came to .Mrs. Chase to 
deal with this Frye account he was then but a commou 
creditor of the corporation. 
The case of Blakey vs. Brinson, decided by the Su-
preme Court of the United States on May 16, 1932 and 
found in Vol. 52 Supreme Court Reporter 516--Advance 
Sheet No. 14, June 1, 1932, was an action against tlw 
receiver of a national bank. \V e quote the facts fr-om 
l\lr. J ustiee Stone's opinion (this was a unanimous de-
cision): 
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''Respondent maintained au interest-bearing 
savings account with the bank, in which his credit 
balance on Octolwr 14, 1929, was $1,961.31. Short-
ly before that date, rc::-;poudcnt had had conver-
sations with an officer of the bank, in the course 
of which the latter signified the willing11ess of 
the bank to purchase $4,000 of United States 
bonds for respondent. On October 10, he stated 
to respondent that the hank would send to Rich-
mond for the bonds, and asked him to bring 
to the hank on the 14th such amount, in addition 
to his credit balance, as would be required to pay 
for the bonds. On the latter date respondent 
drew a check for $2,100 upon another bank, which 
he deposited in his savings aceount, thus increas-
ing his dcposi t balance to $4,0G1.31. Ou the 15th, 
the same officer of the bank informed respondent 
that the bonds had been ordered, and on the 19th 
said to him, 'I have your bonds', and handed to 
him a charge slip whieh stated: "rhis is to ad-
vise yon that we have this day charged your ac-
eount as follows: 
4,000 Fourth L. L. 41Ji ~l Bonds ________ $3,960.00 
Acct. Int. ------------------------------------------------ .60 
Cormnission ---------------------------··············· 4.00 
$3,964.60 
On October 21 the bank charged respondent's 
savings account on its books with $3,964.60, ancl 
ercdited a like amount as a 'deposit' in a 'bond 
account' appearing on its boob. The bond ac-
count contained only a tlaily record of credits 
in the account of d1ceks and deposits and their 
total, ·without any reference to respondent or 
any other customer of the bank. The nature and 
purpose of the aeeount docs not otherwise appear. 
\Vhen the bank closed its <loon; on October 26, 
it was discovered that in fad no bonds had beeJJ 
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purchased, ordered, or re<~eived for the respond-
md. 'l'lw only transactions !1ad ·with respect to 
respondent or his account were the conversations 
with the offieer of the bank and the entry of the 
debit and credit items mentioned. 
On these facts, the Distri<'t Court concluded 
that the bank had rereived $3,~)64.00 in trust for 
the purpose of purchasing the bonds, all<l that, 
as the funds in the hands of the receiver lm<l been 
augmented hy the wrongful commingling of the 
trust fund with the other funds of the hank, re-
spondent was entitled to payment in preference 
to the ge11eral ereditors of the bank. The Court 
of Appeals thought that the trust arose <mly on 
the 19th, when the bank stated that respondent\; 
aecount had been charged with the purehase pri('e 
of the bonds, but reached the same eonclusion as 
respects the increase of the funds in the hands of 
the receiver and the right of respondent to pref-
erential payment. 
The petitioner iusists, as matter of law, that 
no trust ever eame into existence as the result of 
these transactions.'' 
This case is submitted as a condusive authority in 
favor of the defendant receiver's position in this case 
that the Walker-Chase transaetion and conversation rlid 
not change the balan{·e ( $2,909.85) of the Frye aecoun f 
into a trust fund. Justice 8tone cogently writes: 
"It would have been equally competent for 
respondent io have provided for the purchase of 
the bonds either by the creation of a trust of 
funds in the hands of the hank, to be used for 
that purpo:,;e, or hy estaMishing a credit to be 
debited with the cost of the bonds when pur-
chased. But onlv if the former was the method 
acloptecl could r~spondent, upon the bank's in-
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solvency and failure to purchase bonds, recover 
the fund or its proceeds, if traceable, in prefer· 
enee to general creditors. * * * The relationship 
established between the hank and respondent by 
his Ravings ac(~onnt was, from its inception, that 
of debtor and the credit balance of $1,961.31 in 
respondent's account on October 14 represented 
the amount of the bank's indebtedness to him. "' 
* * The situation thus created continued with-
out chang-e until the 19th, when the bank's officer 
advised respondent that the bonds had been pur-
chased. If the advice was true, as respondent be-
lieved it to he, he was then called upon to pay 
to the bank the amount of the purchase price, and 
the hank proceeded, with the assent of the re-
spoudent, to liquidate the supposed obligation 
by charging his savings account with the exact 
amount of the stated purchase price, with inter-
est and r~ounuissions added. vV e can find in this 
method of dischargiug a supposed obligation no 
hint of an intended alteration of the debtor awl 
creditor relationship, with which respondent had 
been content from the beginning, to that of trus-
tee and cestui que trust. 
The court helo·w thought that the legal eon-
sequence to he attributed to the debiting of the 
account with the supposed purchase price of the 
honds was the same as if the respondent had 
cashed a cheek for tl1o nwount and had tl1en pro-
ceeded to hand the money hack to the bank under 
a specific agreement between him and the bank 
that the money was to be held as a special fund, 
for the sole purpose of eompleting the purchase. 
This view is not ·without support. 
* * * * * * * * 
Such a procedure, if actually carried out, 
might afford a basis, whieh is lacking here, for 
the inference that respondent, no long-er c~ontent 
with the role of rreditor, hacl sought to establish 
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a trust fund. But the mere debiting of his ne.-
count, without more, for the reitnbnrsement of 
the hank for the obligation which it was supposed 
to have irwurrcd or paid, lemls no support to such 
an inference. rrhe emwellation of the credit bal-
ance by the debit neither suggests any intention 
to establis:h a trust nor points to any identifiable 
thing which could be the subject of it." 
vVe quote this deeiRion at length because of the sim-
ilarity of the legal positions of Walker in the case at 
bar and of Brinson in the eited ease. Both were common 
creditors when they ~went to their respective debtors anrl 
entered into the transadions which resulted in litigation. 
\Valker desired the eredit halanee of the Frye account 
to be used in paying future indebtedness to be incurred 
by his wife; Brinson desired the credit balance of his 
~avings account to be used in the purchase of Liberty 
bonds. \Yalker, if he had desired to ('reate a trust fund, 
could have secured payment of the balance of the I<'ry(• 
account and then turned it baek to the company under 
a specitie agreement; Brinson eonld have drawn out 
his funds and created a trust fund to buy bonds. Neither 
lollowed a course of action from which it cau he in-
ferred that he desired to withdraw from the role of 
creditor and assume a new one of cestui que trust. Both 
were satisfied to remain creditors. They trusted their 
respec:tive debtor"s to perfor·m their respective agree-
ments; they depended on their debtors remaining solvent 
until the a.greements were executed. They accepted the 
promises of their debto1·s and their a.pparent ji>nancial 
abilities to perform. Walker in his testimony uncon-
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scionsly revealed his correct legal position. After testi-
fying as to his conversation with and instructions to 
Mrs. Char:;e (Abs. 34; Trans. 38 and 39) the following 
colloquy between himself and his counsel occurred (Abs. 
36; Trans. 38): 
"Q. You left it (tho halanee of $2,909.85) 
there upon the relimwe of that statement'? 
A. Left it there expecting it to be paid on 
tny wife's future purchases. 
Q. That is the way you want to apply it 
now? 
A. Yes sir.'' 
Walker relied upon what~ The promise of tho com-
pany (aeting through its agent Chm;e) to apply the bal-
:mce in satisfaction of future purchases made by Mrs. 
\\Talker. Certaiuly such promise does not create trust 
relationship; it simply continued the former one of 
debtor and eredi tor. Walker '·s position is even weaker 
than that of Brinson. In Brinson's ease the bank did) 
debit h·is account to reimburse itr:;elf for the purchase of 
bonds which were not in truth made. ln \V alker 's case 
no debit of tho balance of the Frye account was ever 
made. If as .Justice Stone rmnarks, in Brinson's case, 
"'rho cancellation of tho credit balance by the debit 
neither suggests an intention to establish a trust nor 
points to any identified thing which could be the subject 
of it," how can it he said the balance of the Frye aeeount 
standing alone plus the promise of the company to apply 
it in a gi.veu manner changed such credit balance into a 
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trust fund? The answer, of eoun;e, must he in the neg--
ative. 
The fact that the plaintiff instructed the company 
to use the credit balance of the Frye ac-count for a par-
ticular purpose did not ehange the legal relationship of 
the parties in ·regard to this balance. Walker by his as-
signment had become a general ereditor of the corpor-
ation and he so remained. He was content to remain in 
that role and did not depart from it, and the orders he 
gave to Mrs. Chase, as eompany representative, had no 
affect on this relationship. The eredit balance was not 
paid to him, and hy him returned to the company on a 
specific trust so that particular funds were segregated 
from the general funds and assets of the eompany. A8 
further sustaining appellant's position there are cited: 
Northern 1Hugar Corporation v. 'I'hompson, 
13 Fed. (2nd) 829; 
Noyes vs. First National Bank, 1G7 N. Y. 
Supple. 288; 
Craig VH. Bank of Graub~', :no Mo. App. 
334; 
Wetherell vs. 0 'Brien, 140 Ill. 14G; 
Mutual Aecideut Assn. v .• Jacobs, 141 Ill. 
261. 
Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene B. & 'l'. Co., 36 
Idaho 108, 210 Pae. G86; 
Marine Bank v. F'ulton Bank, 2 vVall. (U. 
R.) 2G2, 17 Law Ed. 785; 
Commercial Rank of Penn. v. Armstrong, 
148 U. S. flO, 1:3 .Supt. Ct. 533, 37 L. Eel. 
363 ~ 
Minard v;;;. Watts, 18G Fed. 242; 
_F'allga tter ,·s. vV a tts, 11 Fed. (2nd) 383 ; 
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Phoenix Bank Ys. Risley, 111 U. S. 125; 
Fidelity Assn. vs. Rodgers, 180 Cal. 683, 
182 Pac. 426. 
Let it he assumed for purpose of argument that 
\V alker paid over to the company from his own funds 
the sum of $2,909.85 and that at the time he did so the 
couven.;atioll hetween him and Mrs. Chase occurred, and 
that the funds so paid over by \\Talker were taken into 
the bank accounts of the company and used by it in the 
transaction of i t8 lm8iness-all with Walker's knowledge 
as in the case at bar-. Can it be doubted that he sustained 
any other relation than that of creditor to the company? 
The authorities cited in the preceding paragraph are con-
elusive in supporting the statement he would be only a 
common creditor. In addition, the Court should refer-
to: 
Schenck ()lwmieal Co. vs. Industrial A. aud 
D. Go., 121 N. Y. Supple. 838; 
Yorkshire Inve8tmeut Co. V8. )j-,owler, et al., 
78 Fed. (C. C. A.) 56; 
Mahler v. Sanche, 79 N. E. (Ill.) 9; 
Tucker vs. Lim, 57 Atlantic (N . • T. Equity) 
1017; 
Reddington V8. J_,anahau, et al., 59 Mary-
land 429. 
It should be constantly bomo in mind that Walker 
had positive knowledge that Miss Frye's funds had been 
intermingled in the company's bank accounts and had 
been used in the conduct of the company business. He 
knew the company had set up no trust fund to guarantee 
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a return of the loans made by Miss Frye to the company. 
He knevv the entire transaction with regard to employee 
savings and is therefore conclusively charged with hav· 
iug freely assented, after he became the owner of Miss 
Frye's claim, the pri·or relation ·of debtor and creditor 
be continued. 
That ·one party to a transaction reposes faith and 
confidence in the other party which is violated or ahuse<l 
is no ground for adjudging that a trust relation existed 
between them. rr'here are additional elements which mnst 
be present before a comt of equity is justified iu casting 
the wrong-doer in the role of "trustee.'' The mmal 
remedies on the law side of the c.ourt can he entirely 
emasculated or destroyed if the measure is simply 
whether tho wrong-doer violated a trust. The breach of 
? simple contraet is, in au ethical sense, the abuse of 
trust and coufidence, but no eourt has had the hardihood 
to make the con tract breaker a "trustee". In the case 
at bar, Walker directed the company that the balance of 
the Frye account should be used to pay his wife's futun~ 
insurred indebtedness. Plaintiff did not seek iu this 
action to eompel such application, but speeifically with-
draw (-with consent of appellants counsel) the right to 
set off (.r\Jhs. 75, Renshaw Trans. Gl) Mrs. Walker'~:; 
indebtedness against the balance of the Frye claim, and 
rested his action upon the theory that a trust had been 
created in his favor. Out of the breach .of the instrue-
tions by the company, plaintiff cannot construct a trm;t. 
r.l1he authorities do not sustain him in his effort. 
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'' rt'his complaint, in effect alleges, conversion 
of money by defendant and the facts therein 
stated utterly fail to bring the case within the 
domain ·of equity, as the elements necessary to 
ereate the relation of trustee and c~estui que trust 
are not shown to exit. True plaintiff in his com-
plaint designates the money he seeks to re·cover 
as a trust fund, but this, ho.wever, is only the con-
Plusion of the pleader. The relations of the parties 
to each other, because of and ,,~hich grow out of 
the transaction in question, must be- determined 
by the facts, what they did in the premises and 
not by what the pleadeT ehom;es to label or eall 
it in his pleading." 
'' \Vhere one person employs another as an 
agen1, loans money or sells property on credit, 
a confidence and trust is imposed, to a greater or 
less extent, and yet such transadions have never 
been regarded by courts as falling within any 
recognized class of trusts." · 
Weer v. Gaud, 88 Illinois 490. 
''The various affairs of life in almost every 
act beh-een individuals in trade and commerce 
involve the Teposing of confidence or trust in each 
other, and yet it has nevm• been supposed that be-
cause such a C'onfidence or trust in the integrity 
of another has been extended and abused, that 
therefore, a Pourt of e(1uity would in all such cases 
assume jurisdiction.'' 
Doyle v. Murphy, 22 Illinois 502. 
"It is true that uses and trusts are a favored 
part of the jurisdiction of the chancellor, and 
frequently he will on that ground, decide in cases 
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where the law may be adequate to give relief. But, 
notwithstanc1iug this acknowledged authority, it 
c~nnot be extended to every ca·se where one party 
has trusted another, or in other words, placed a 
confidence which has been abused. If so, every 
case of haihuent, and every instance of plaeing 
chattel:,;, by loa11s or hire, would be swallowed up 
by oourts of equity. Nay, every ease where credit 
was given for debt or duty, would soon he drawn 
into the same vortex.'' 
Ashley's Administrators v. Denton 1 Litt. 
(Ky.) 86. 
"Something more than a trust reposed in one 
is required to make him a 'trusteP' according 
to its intent." 
People ex rei. Smith , .. Commissioner, 100 
N. Y. 216, :3 N. I~. 8:"). 
''In almost all ·of the eonunercial tmnsadio11s 
of the country eonfideuce is reposed iu the punc-
tuality and integrity of the debtor, and a viola-
tion of these is, iu a commercial sense, a di'Sre-
g·ard of a trust. But this is not the relatiou 
spoken of in the first sedion of the ad." 
Wilson v. Kirhy, 88 Illinois GGG; 
Chapman v. Forsyth, 2 Howard (U. S.) 202. 
\Ve make reference to the statement of J ustiee Fol-
land in the recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Tooele County Board ·of Education v. Hadlock _______ _ 
Utah ________________ ; 11 Paci11c (2nd) 320 (at page) 323: 
"No case has been called to our atteution, 
and none has been found by us, holding that under 
circumstances such as these a deposit made in a 
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bank by means of a check <lra wn on that 
bank will not be impressed with a trust where it 
would have heeu so impressed had the check been 
drawn on another bank. It is undisputed that 
there was in tho bank more money than was re-
quired to pay the check when it was presented to 
tho bank on Dec. 24, 19i30 * * * The transaction 
was one equivalent to the hoard demanding and 
receiving its money and thereafter placing it on 
depm;it iu the bank to its credit.'' 
In this ease a trust ex maleficio was admitted, if tho 
other requirements of law vvere met. The above quoted 
c:xcerpt vvm; in answer to the Bank Oommissioner's ar-
g-ument that by reason of the transaction no new money 
came into the bank and therefore its assets were nolt 
inereaEwd or augmented. r:rhe ruling of the court is cor-
rect sinee it was dealing with the question of augmenta-
tion of assets and not with the question as to whether 11. 
creditor· had changed his legal status from that of credi-
tor to cestni que tntst, which in the instant case is one 
of the important issues. 
The above quoted ruling in the Tooele Bank case 
cannot support a contention in this case that since Wal-
ker might have received a check for the balance of the 
:F'rye account ($2,909.85) and then forthwith endorsed 
aud delivered tho check back to the company upon an 
express trust, that Walker's transaction and conversa-
tion with tho accountant, Chase, was such a legal equiv-
alent. This was the exact argument advanced by Brin-
::;on in the United States Supreme Court case (above 
cit ell aud discussed at leng·th) to sustain his position 
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that his status of creditor had been chanped to that of 
cestui que t1·u.st. The court unanimously denied the 
soundness of such logic. 
Thoro is a detini te distinction between the position 
of the Tooele County Board of Education in its transa('--
tion and the position that Walker occupies in this case. 
These distinetions may be set forth in the following 
manner: 
Tooele County Board 
1-A Trust ex malificio in 
favor of the Board arose 
because Sec. 4500 Comp. 
Laws of Utah, as amended, 
had been violated bv the 
Board's treasurer ari~l the 
bank. 
2-The Board by receiving 
a check from the county 
treasurer drawn 011 the 
bank and depositing it to 
the credit of its aerount in 
the bank, affirmatively as-
sumed a position, by opeT-
c~tion of said Sec. 4500, as 
amended, other than that of 
creditor. The statute cre-
ated a trust without regard 
to the intention of the 
Board. 
Walker 
1-Walker, as assignee of 
Miss Frye, was a common 
creditor of 'Valker Bros. 
Dry Goods Co. when he 
eame to deal vvith Mrs. 
Chase awl give iustruetions 
as to the disposition of the 
Frve aeeouut then owned 
by· him. 
:!--\\~alker, after orcleriuo· 
$:lOOO of the F'ne aceom~t 
to he used to pa·y the thou 
pres ell t indebtedness due 
ilw company from his wife, 
t·ook no action from \vhich 
it can he inferred that he 
intended to transform his 
position as creditor, into 
that of cestui que trust. He 
simply g·ave orders as to 
how the balance due him 
should he used. He elected 
to allow the balance to 
stand to his crodi t. 
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:3-The deposit of the 
county treasurers check to 
the eredit of the Board ef-
fected a complete ehange in 
the ownership of the funds. 
4--The Court was consid-
ering the question of aug-
mentation of assets and its 
ruling is directed to this 
point. 
:J-'L'he balance of the Frve 
aceount remained in its 
previous sta:tus, and Wal-
ker, after his instructions 
to Chase, still remained the 
owner of it. 
4--The court must decide 
whether 'Valker changed 
his position from creditor 
to cestui que trust. 
Particular reference is made to the case of Bledsoe 
vs. H annnons, :~G Ari:t.ona 4~9; 287 Pac. 297, which was 
distinguished in Tooele County Board v. Hadlock, supra, 
as having no application to the situation under consid-
eration. Frederick's actions in that case bear a close 
similarity to those of Walker in the present case. Neither 
of them changed their relation in regard t'o their respec-
tive elaims ctJt·d ·in each case there was no change in the 
m.cnership of the indebtedness. ~While rightly ruled out 
of consideration in the Tooele Bank case, it has a proper 
applica1tion to the situation in the case at bar. Its ir-
relevancy in the one case makes it in point in the other 
case. 
II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AT THE TIME OF THE 
APPOINTMENT OF DEFENDANT AS RECEIVER OF 
WALKER BROS. DRY GOODS CO. THAT THERE 
CAME INTO ITS HANDS SUMS OF MONEY WHICH 
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REPRESENTED MISS FRYE'S SO-CALLED "DE-
POSITS" IN EITHER THEIR ORIGINAL OR SUB-
STITUTED FORM IN EXCESS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM OF $2,909.85 AND THAT THE ASSETS OF 
THE COMPANY WHICH CAME INTO THE HANDS 
OF THE RECEIVER WERE AUGMENTED BY AND 
TO THE EXTENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM. HENCE 
FINDING NO. X IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
THE SAME. 
Assignments of Error Nos. 6 and 7 c·over the a boYe 
proposition. 
There is positive evidence iu the record as t.o the 
methods pursued by tltu eompany in handling funds 
loaned to the company by its employees. 'rhey were in-
termixed with other reeeipts and funds of the ('Oillpan.Y 
and were deposited in the eompany banks. "\\'hen it 
came to making deposits no distinction as to funds rep-
resenting employees savings and funds representing tlw 
sales ·was made. They were all put together.'' ( Ahs. 5:~; 
Renshaw 'rrani-l. 3H and 39). When the bank balance" 
accumulated to a cel"tain point, time certificates of (lc-
posit \vould be purchased (..Abs. G4; Renshaw Trans. 40). 
No special eertifieatcs of (leposit were purchased with 
the employees loans. 'l1 ime depm;it eertifieates were al'-
quired with Lank eredits, which contained general n'-
eeipts of the company and the employee loans. (Ahs. 
54; Henshaw Trans. 40). 
It will be noted tlwt ·in each instance the funds rrp-
resenting employee luwns were deposited in cornpMI.y 
33 
banks. There is no evidence that nny other disposition 
or use 1cas ever made of them. The obligations of the 
company were paid from the common fund at the banks, 
composed of receipts from all sources. (Abs. 63; Ren-
slm w Trans. 48). Sometime previous to the date upon 
which tho defendant receiver was appointed and as-
sumed control of the company and its properties, the 
time certificates of deposit had been cashed and the funds 
used in the company business (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans. 
44). No certifica tos of deposit existed upon the re-
ceiver's appointment. (Abs. GO; Renshaw Trans. 44). 
The reconl is silent as to whether on date of appoint-
ment of rec-eiver there were balances to the credit of 
the company at its hanks. The defendant in its answer, 
hO\Yever, admitted that at the time of its appointment 
there ca.me into 'its hands sums of money in excess of 
plaintiff's elaims. However, it will be noted that this 
admission does 1wt admit that there were f1mds on de-
posit ·in the depositMy banks of the company. The ald-
utission is litera.l ''that there carne ·into its hands tsums 
of money." This is not an admission that there ·were 
ba.nk balauces im favor of the company, wh·ich cam,e under 
the control and into the possession of the receiver. It 
is ain admission that 1cash funds not on deposit came 
·into the rece·iver's possession. 
'l'here is no evidence that these cash funds ·which 
the receiver admitted it received contained a peuny of 
money paid in by Aliee Frye. Beyond all peradventure 
the~, did not, for Walker dealt with Mrs. Chase in May 
or early June, 19~}0, prior to the receivership (Abs. 12; 
Trans. 20 and 21) as to the Frye account and Miss Frye 
had made her so called "deposits" long prior to that 
time. Deposits by the company were made daily (Abs. 
53; Renshavv rrrans. 38) in its depository banks. 
The deductions frolll this evidence are obvious: (a) 
the cash funds which came into the receiver's hands eon-
tained none of Alice Frye's money, and (b) at date of 
receiver's appointment there were no credit balances Rt 
the banks in favor of the company. Hence Finding X 
is clearly erroneous and there is not the slightest evi-
dence to support it. rrhe balance of the Frye account 
in no sense augmented the assets of the company cmning 
into defendants' bmtk as receiver. 
III. 
THE FUNDS OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR PAID TO 
WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY 
WERE NOT HELD IN ANY SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR 
FUND, BUT WERE INTERMINGLED IN THE 
FUNDS OF THE CORPORATION AND USED IN 
THE OPERATION OF ITS BUSINESS. THE EM-
PLOYEES' SAVINGS "DEPOSITS" HAVE NOT BEEN 
TRACED INTO ANY FUND, SECURITY OR ASSET 
COMING INTO THE ~OSSESSION OF THE RE-
CEIVER BUT ON 'THE CONTRARY, THE EVIDENCE 
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT THEY WERE EN-
TIRELY DISSIPATED PRIOR TO THE APPOINT-
MENT OF THE RECEIVER. HENCE, EVEN IF 
THE "DEPOSITS" CONSTITUTED TRUST FUNDS, 
THE PLAINTIFF MUST FAIL BECAUSE HE CAN-
NOT TRACE THE "DEPOSITS" IN THEIR ORIG-
INAL OR SUBSTITUTED FORM. 
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Assignments of Error Nos. 8, 10 ( d and e) and 11 
are the foundation upou which the discussion of the 
foregoing proposition rests. 
'The employee '' depoSiib-;'' after having been re-
ceived by the company, were commingled indiscrimiuate~y 
with funds of the company reeei ved from its daily sales 
and other sources. (Abs. 5:3; Renshaw 'l'rans. 39). These 
company funds were deposited daily in the banks, and 
in making up the deposits no distinction as to funds re-
presenting employees' savings and funds representing 
sales was made. '!'hey were all put together. The 
company had no special bank account in which the em-
ployees' savings were kept alone. (Abs. 53; Renshaw 
Trans. 39; Abs. 57; Renshaw 'frans. 42). The employees' 
savings were not earmarked. (Aibs. 34; Renshaw Trans. 
40). The company maintaine!l several banking de-
positories and when the credit balance in favor of the 
company in a particular bank would reach a certain 
point, a time certificate of depos,it would be purchased 
from such bank. ( Abs. G4; Renshaw Trans. 40; AJbs. 58; 
Renshaw 'l'rans. 43), but at no time was a certificate of 
deposit purchased which contained on~y the funds of em-
ployees which had been paid over to the company. (Abs. 
57 ; R,ensha w Trans. 42). These eertifiea tes of deposit 
were '' emergenc~' funds'' and were intended to take care 
of "anything in an emergency." (Ahs. :l2; 'rrans. 36). 
'l'here were uo time eertiftcates of deposit owned by the 
company on date of the appointment of the receiver. 
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They had all been cashed prior to that datl~ and used in 
the company busine::;s. (Abs. 59; Renshaw Trans. 44). 
rrhe funds paid over to the company by Mi::;s :B_,rye 
were handled in the same manner as the funds paid to 
the company by itt:; own employees. (Abs. 19; Trans. 25; 
Abs. 23; Trans. 27). 
The defendant in its ans\ver admitted that at the 
time of its appointment as receiver there eame into its 
hands as sueh reeeiver ''sums of money in exce:-;s of 
plaintiff's claim," but it denieu that the asset::; of \Val-
ker Bros. Dry Goods Company coming into its hanus 
as receiver were augmented by and to the extent of 
plaintiff's claim. (Abs. 4, 5, 6 and 7). 
The legal prineiples involved in the situation pre-
sented by the evidence in this case eannot be subjeet 
to any seriou:-; dispute. The Supreme Cburt of Utah 
has definitely eluciuated the rules of law which govern 
in this jurisdietion. r_f_'he appellant therefore submits 
the following authorities, whi<'h support its position as 
set forth above: 
"'I' he doctrine of equity, as regards property 
di::;posed of by persons in a fiduciary position, 
is that whether the dispm;itiou of it he rightful 
or wrongful, the henefieial owner is c'ntitled to 
the proeeeds, wlwtever be their form, provided 
only he can ideutify tlwm. If they cannot be 
identified, by rea::;ou of the tru,.;t money being 
mingled with thai of thu trnsle<', Uwn the cestui 
que. trust is entitled to a elHuge upon the new 
investment to the extent of the trust money trace-
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able into it; that then~ is uo <listinetiou between 
an express trustee and an agent, or bailee, or col-
lector of rents, or anybody else in a fiduciary 
position, and that tlJCre is no difference between 
inveshnenis in tho purchase of lands, or chattels, 
or bonds, or loam;, or moneys <lepot-:ited in a bank 
account.'' 
Sir Ooo .• J essel, l\1 aster of tho Rolls; quoted 
with approval iu National Bank vs. In-
surance Oo. 104 U. S. 68, and adopted 
as the rule in Utah in \\'ad dell vs. 
Waddell, an Utah 435; 104 Pac. 743. 
"The C'ourts have frequently considered and 
passed upon claims like tho one before us, hut 
we know of no case whore it has been held that 
a trust could be impressed on property or funds 
\Vhere it is conceded to be impossible to trace or 
identify tho property or funds, either in its or-
iginal or substituted form * * *. It was not held 
iu the Waddell C'ase ( ~~6 Utah 4i15) nor in any 
other, so far as we arc aware, that a court has 
ever impressed, or has attempted to impress, a 
trust upon certain property or upon a certain 
fund where the original trust property or trust 
fund can no longer be traced or identified, either 
in its original or substituted form." 
Kent vs. Kent, 50 Utah 44, 165 Pac. 271, 
15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1100. 
'' \Vheuever a trust fund has been wrongfully 
eonverted into another speeios of property, if its 
identity can be traeed, it will be held, in its new 
form, liable to tho rights of the cestui que trust. 
No change in its state and form can divest it of 
sueh trust. So J.ong as it can be identified, either 
as the original property of the eestui que trust, 
or as the product of it, equity will follow it; and 
the right of reclamation attaches to it until de-
tached by the superior equity of a hona fide pur-
chaser, for a valuable consideration, without no-
tice. The substitute for the original thing- fol-
low!" the nature of the thing itself RO long- as it 
ean he aseertainell to he snch. But the rig·ht of 
pursuing· it fails when the means of asrertainmcnt 
fails. This is always the case wheu the subject 
matter is turned into mone~~ and mixed and ron-
founded in a g·eneral mass of property of the same 
description.'' 
Thompson Appeal 22 Penn. State lG. 
"A trust rreditor is not entitled to a prcf-
erenre over general creditors of the insolvent 
merely on the gTotmd of the nature of hiR claim. 
To au'thorize s~ch a preference, Rome specific rec-
og-nized equity founded on tlw relation of the debt 
to the assets in the handR of the assignee or re-
ceiver, and whirh entitles the elaimant, accord-
ing to cqnita hlc prineiplcR, to a prefcrcnPe in 
navmcnt ont of those as:-;etR, must hr cstahlisherl 
by. evidence. The person rlaiming- to he a trust 
creditor must in order to establish hiR rig·ht to 
a preference, trace the trust money into some srw-
ci:fic property, fund, sccnrit~v, or account of tlw 
insolvent \Yhich has passed into the hands of the 
receiver or assignee, all(l the proeeeds of which 
arc to he distributed. TT e must identify the fuml 
out of which he demands to he prefer~·ed in dis-
tribution either as the original trust property or 
as a product of it. 'x' * * The 1·ight to pursue 
the fund fails when the means of identifying awl 
ascertaining it fails." 
Groff vs. City Savings Fund & Trust Co, 
4G Penn. Superior Ct. 423; 
Lifter vs. Earl Co. 76 Penn. Superior Ct. 
173; 
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Corporation CommiRsion v. .Merchants 
Bank & Co., 1:38 S. :B.J. 23 (R C.). 
'"rhe authorities arc generally agreed that 
the rig-ht of the ecstui que trm-:t to reclaim trust 
funds in specie, or impress a trm;t upon other 
property in the hands of the trustee, iR founded 
upon the right of property and not on tho grounds 
of compensation for its loss, alHl hence the bene-
ficiary of a trust fund is not entitled, merely be-
canRe of the character of its claim, to payments 
out of the insolvent trustee's assets in preference 
to general creditors, hut must trace and identify 
the trust funds in order to reelaim them. * * * 
There are, however, well-established principles 
which govern the duties of a cestui que trust, aR 
depositor in a bank, who seeks to trace and re-
claim his fund. It is well settled that, when a 
trustee wrongfully counningles trust funds with 
his own funds, equity will impress the trust upon 
the entire mass with which the trust fund has 
been commingled in order to permit the reclama-
tion of the trust fund. ~W'" addell v. ~\Y addell, 36 
Utah, 435, 104 P. 743. The leading case in whicl1 
the principles applicable to this situation were 
announced is the English (~ase of In ro Hallet's 
Estate, 13 Law Rep., Ghancery Div. 696. There 
tho rule was laid down, which has since been fol-
lowed with almost unbroken uniformity, that the 
cestui que trust will not be called upon to identify 
particular money constituting his trust fund, but 
that, if the trustee has mingled the trust funds 
with his own, the entire mass is impressed with 
the trust to the extent of the amount of the trust 
funds, and where the trustee had made payments 
from the mingled fund he will be presumed to 
ha vo expended for his o\vn use and benefit, first, 
his own money, and, lastly, the trust fund, and 
that tho cestui qno trust will be permitted to 
recover from such mingled fund, and in prefer-
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enee to common creditors, the amount of money 
representing the lowest halanc·e to whieh tlte 
mingled funu fell from the inception of the trust 
to the date of insolveney. There may he some 
qualifications to this general rule, but, so far as 
this case is eoncenwd, the principles stated are 
applicable. The rule is also stated as follows: 
"The same rule as to identifying or tracing the 
funds applies to publie as to private funds. The 
money must be identified or traeed into some 
other specific fund or property. There is a pre-
sumption, however, that what remains at the time 
of insolveney is a trust fund. The law presumes 
that trust funds were not appropriated and that 
a balance of ·cash in the hanus of the clepository 
is the trust funus. '' 22 H. C. L. 231. 
In ease the~ mingled fund is sufficient to pay 
the trust claimant in full, the presumption is that 
only the money of the trustee has been expended, 
but, where the trustee has expended, not only his 
own money out of tlte mingled fmul, hut has also 
dipped into and expended pnrt of the trust fund, 
the trust claimant will he entitled to recover only 
the amouut which remains, aucl he is entitled to 
recover tl!is, even though the balance is less than 
the total of the trust fund.'' 
rrooe!e County Board vs. Hadloek, 11 Pac. 
(2nd) at pgs. i324 and 325. 
"But aside from this view of the evidence, 
the claim to a general c·harge upon any and all 
property acquired by the hank, through the use 
of the general fulHls of the hank with which this 
trust fund has been hlended is not supported by 
the weight of authority; nor do the cases decided 
by this court go so far. rPlwt the misuse of this 
trust fund has g:mc to swell, in one form or an-
other the ge11eral assets of the bank, is not enough 
to charge the whole \Yith a lieu, will not be seri-
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ously contested. The cases \Yhich deny such a 
co11teution arc numerous. To -impress a tntst up-
on the property of a tort feasor who has used the 
trust fmzd in his zwivate afj'airs it mu.st be traced 
in its original shape or .ntbstituted form." 
Orawford County vs. Strawn, 157 Fed. (C. 
C. A.) 1100,15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 100; 
Srhuyler Ys. J.,ittlcficld, 2:32 U. S. 707. 
"But we believe the majority cloetrine is 
based upon sound prim·iplm; awl should be ad-
hered to. Where no spceifie lieu is created by con-
trad, or acts of the partie:-;, Hone exists. 'J.1he 
only course open to equity is to discover the cor--
pus of the trust fund or to follow the ehanges of 
trammmtations of the trust moneys into 80me par-
tieular property or fund that ran be charged with 
the trust, saving of course the right8 of innocent 
purchasers for value." 
:Meyer::;, R.cceiver v .. Matusek, 98 Florida at 
pg. 1145, 125 .Southcm 360. 
"The result of these deei8ions i8 that merely 
showing that the trustee has received trust fund8 
will impress a lien upon his assets unless it is 
shown that his assets were not increased by the 
misappropriation. But the great weight of au-
thority is against this view." 
Perry on 'l'rn8h> (7th Ed) Sec. 836. 
''When trust money becomes so mixed up 
witih the ·trustee's individual funds that it is im-
possible to trace and identify it as entering into 
some specific property, the tru8t ceases. The 
eonrt will go as far m; it 'can in this tracing and 
following the trust money; but when as a matter 
of fad, it cannot be traced, the equitable right 
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of the ee:,;tui que trust to follow it fails. Under 
such circumstauces, if tho tru:,;teo has become 
bankrupt, tho court cannot say that tho trust 
money it-~ to be found somo\vhore in tho general 
estate of the trustee that shll remains; he may 
have lost it with property of his o\m; and in such 
case the cestui quo trust can only come in and 
share \Yith the general creditors." 
Little vs. Chadwick, 151 Ma:,;s. 10~), 
2:3 N. K 1005, 7 L. R. A. 570. 
"As a con:,;equenco there have been decisions 
in some American states to the effect that if one's 
general estate has been enric1hed by the proceeds 
of trust property, the trust may be established 
against the general assets even though the estate 
is insolvent. ''' * '~ But these eases have been 
either expressly overruled or groately limited and 
qualified. * * '' In some states it has been held 
that, while it is not tmougll to show that the trust 
property went into the general assets, it is enough 
to charge the whole estate with a trnst, if it can 
be shown that the proeeeds remained unexpended 
somewhere iu the estate. 'x' * * But by tho great 
weight of authority, n trust cannot be established 
again1st the proceeds o.f trust property, which has 
been disposed of, unless the proceeds c.an be iden-
tified and traeed into some specifie fund or prop-
erty. This is the doctPinP of·Iu rc Hallet's Estate 
(13 Ch. Div. 696) to whieh we have already re-
ferred.'' 
Lowe v . .Jones, 192 Mass. 94, 78 N. E. 42, 
6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 487; 
Atkins v. Atkins, 180 N. E. (Mast-~.) Gl3. 
"Before a eestui que trust ean elaim speeifie 
real or person'al property, he must slJOw that it is 
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the identical property originally covered by the 
trust or that it is the fruit or product thereof in 
a new form." 
Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 California 22. 
''To justify a recovery a beneficiary must b0 
able to follow and i<lentify bhe property either in 
its ori~:,rin'al or substituted form." 
Orcut·t v. Gold, 117 Cal. 315, 49 Pac. 188; 
FJlizade v. Eilizade, 137 Cal. 634, 66 Pac. 369. 
:msta te of Arms, 186 Cal. 554. 
Holland v. Bank of Italy, 1 Pac. (2nd) 1031. 
"It is not enoug·h that the Estate o·f Lemon 
may have beeu indire'ctly increased by reason of 
his having used the trust fund to pay his own 
debts." 
Martin v. Smith, 33 Idaho 692, 197 Pac. 823. 
"The right of a beneficiary to reclaim a trust 
fund is brased upon his right of property, not upon 
any right as a preferred creditor of the trustee." 
Chase & Baker Co. v. Olmsted, 93 1,V ash. 306, 
160 Pac. 952; 
Heidelback v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 
164 Pac. 247. 
"'The proof does not definitely trace the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the converted property into 
the cash on hand or into any specific assets of the 
bank. It merely shows that the proceeds of these 
securities went into and swelled the assets of the 
bank, and thereaft\'r thev were usecl as all other 
assets in the ordinary oy;eration of the bank. Un--
der such cireurnstancers, the judgment of the court 
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was erroneous in impressing a trust on the en-
tire assets of t1he bank.'' 
'rylcr County State Bank v. SltiverH, 
6 S. W. (2nd) (Texas) 108; 
Prior v. Davis, Administrator, 
109 Alabama 117, 19 South 440; 
Matter of Cavin v. Glea1son, 105 N. Y. 256; 
Maged v. Bank of United States, 
234 App. Div. (N. Y.) 295, 254 N. Y. 
ISuppl. 569; 
Schneider v. Winchester Development Co., 
149 Atlantic (N .• J.) 636; 
Commonweath v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., 
95 Atl. (Pa.) 574; 
O'Neil v. Cleveland, 22:3 N. W. (Wis.) 82; 
Rainwater v. Wildman, 
289 S. W. (Ark.) 488. 
The testimony of Mrs. Chase and the plaintiff shows 
without qualific,ation t1l1at all employees' savin~s de-
posits, after being intermingled and confused with cor-
porate funds received from aH other sourees, were de-
posited in one or mme of thP banking depositories of the 
comp'any. There \Yas no special bank account to receive 
these employee deposits, and they were eonsidered as 
part of, the general funds of the company for use in its 
business a>ctivities. 'rhe evidence further show:,; that 
these bank credits were drawn upon without reference 
to the source~ of origin of the creditH. 'rhe general all-
ligations and expense of operation were paid from them, 
and when an employee "depositor" desired to "with-
draw" any of his "deposits" tlwy were given a cthcck 
upon any of the depository banks without regard to the 
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source of the funds on credit. (AJbs. 64; Renshaw r:L'rans. 
48). 
On the assumption that Miss :B-,rye 's funds or sav-
iugs when pai(l to Hw compauy became trust funds and 
uot a de'ht (we have clearly demoustrated above the 
error of such assnrnptiou) the first step plaintiff is com-
pelled to take is to trace these funds from the inter-
mingled bank accounts where they h'ad heen confused 
with other Crorporation funus. rrhis he apparently at-
tempted to do by' testimouy of Mrs. Chase, and the 
plaintiff reg·arding time certificates o.f deposit. (Aibs. 31, 
rrrans. 36; Abs. :33, rrrans. 36 and 37; A,bs. 48, Renshaw 
Trans. 34; Abs. 51, Renshaw Trans. 36). In order to 
counect the employees' deposits with these time certi-
ficates of deposit plaintiff testified (Abs. 34; rrrans. 37) : 
''A. Well, we had those special deposits 
there to take care of the specia'l accounts and 
other items as I stated before, those special ac-
counts were the only liability we had that was 
due on demand.'' 
Mrs. Chase stated (Abs. 51; Renshaw Trans. 36): 
''A. This is what I meant by 'emergency'; 
we had some employees that had, say as high as 
ten thousand dollars despostited, if they should 
want to draw that ten t·housand out, but we 
didn't have the mouev in our chr,ckinq accournt, or 
in the t,ill, we eonld draw it out of this emergenc~v 
account to pay them, this special aceount, if we 
had to do that''. 
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:B-,rom this and like testimony it is evident that plain-
tiff is attempting to claim that these time certificates of 
deposit ~were a trust funll to protect the employees' sav-
ing" deposits," but it shou'lcl be noted that even on plain-
tiff's own evidence this position must fail, because 
(a) Plaintiff in his own testimony admits these 
time certificates of deposit were "a reset·ve account to 
take care of ainything in a·u eme·rgency" (A!bs. 32; Trans. 
36) and "we had t,}wsc special deposits there to take care 
of the special accounts a·11d other items ·~ ~· ~· '' (Abs. 34; 
Trans. 37). 
(b) Mrs. Chase states if "zce tlidn't have tha.t 
money in our checking account or in the till'' we could 
draw it out of this emergcuey account to pay them (Abs. 
51; Renshaw Trans. 36). 
These statements belie the claim that tile time certi-
ficates of depos,it were a trust fund set up to protect the 
employees' saving "deposits", because they reveal two 
definite faets which iu themselves contradiet plaintiff's 
theory: P irst, the time certificates were to protect ''any-
thing in an emergency''; and seeondly, '' Withdrawals'' 
by employees were made from these time certificates onl~· 
if "we didn't haue that money i'll rmr checki·ng account or 
in the till." How can it be sure,essfully claimed that the 
time certificates were a trust fund for M1e benefit of the 
employee "depositors" when these two admissions arc 
made? 
Ho,wever, aside from the intriusil· condition of 
plaintiff's evideuee, plaintiff must rlepend upon Mrs. 
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Chase's testimony given below to show that the em-
ployees' saving funds went into the time certificates 
(Abs. 54; Reushaw Trans. 40): 
"Q. You didn't earmark that money so it 
would go right over to the Continental to pay a 
time eer:tificate, did you"? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't earmark it so it would be Mr. 
Renshaw's to buy a certificate of deposit, did you'? 
A. No. 
Q. But that weut into the general account 
indiscriminately7 
A. Yes.'' 
and a'lso (A'bs. 58; Renshaw Trans. 43): 
'' Q. What was .the practice in buying these 
time eertificates of deposit, how often would you 
buy them1 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. W ou:ld you do t,he actual purehasing of 
them, or would "\Va1kcr or Dreyfous, or who at-
tended to that? 
A. Well, the Manager of the store would tell 
ns when to get them. 
Q. And then you would draw a cheek on your 
general account 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Dc:pending-, one time if the National Coil-
per had a surplus balance, yon would hny tho 
certifieate of <leposit at that bank~ 
A. Yes." 
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This evidence clearly shows that (a) time certificates 
of deposit were purchased from the general bank ac-
counts of tl1e company and that (b) no certificates were 
purchased which represented employees' "deposits" 
exclusively. It is lef,t to guesses and surmises as to 
whether or not these time certificates of deposit ~were 
pur.chased w,ith Mrs. ] 1 rye 's funds. The chances are 
equal as to whether or not an)' of her funds went into the 
time certifica,t.es. Certainly there is no positive and di-
rect evidence that such was the fad. 'rhe most favor-
able aspect of plaintiff's evidence at this point leaves it 
to a matter of conjeeture. 
If, however, we accept a pure assumption or guess 
that Miss Frye's funds \Yent into time certificates, the 
next step in tracing the funds is wholly fa,tal to plain-
tiff's caus.e for note Mrs. Chase's evidence. (Abs. 59; 
Renshaw Trans. 44): 
"Q. You want your evidence to stand that 
at the time the reeeiver was appointed, there 
~were no time certificates~ 
A. No, none then.'' 
and also (Abs. 60; Renshaw Trans. 44). 
"(~. But you know there were none lll ex-
istence at that time"? 
A. Not at the time of the receiver." 
It is therefore plain t·hat prior to the date the re-
ceiver was appointed, these certifieates of deposit had 
49 
been cashed and the proceeds used in the transaetion of 
the company buS'iness. Certainly no time certificates 
came into the hamds of the Receiver. T·lms ends plain-
tiff's trust fund search. lie ean go no further in his 
proof. 
Under the authorities cited above and in accordance 
with the Uta·h rule, plaintiff must trace Miss Frye's 
money into some specific fund or property, and "where 
the original trm;t property or trust fund can no longer 
be traced or ideut·ified either in its or,iginal or substi-
tuted form" the trust fails and plaintiff stands as a gen-
eral creditor. He cannot claim a lien on the general 
as•sets of the corporation, for the Utah Supreme Court 
has expressly and emphatically adopted the majority 
rule which refuses to extend the principle of tracing trust 
funds beyond its log:ical scope. The fact that receiver 
received ''sums of money in excess of the plaintiff'B 
claim" forms no basis upon whieh plaintiff can claim a 
lieu upon the generwl assets of the corporation. The evi-
dence shows that (a) M.iss Frye's funds were inter-
mingled and confused with the income from all other 
sources and t.hus ·confused were deposited in one or more 
of the company banks; (h) that it may be only conjec-
tured that all or some part of Miss Frye's funds were 
used to purchase time certifieates of deposit, and (c) all 
time certificates were cashed and used in the company 
business and none reached the hands of the receiver. 
Under the rule annoum·ed in Utah in the Kent case 
(supra) and Tooele Bank ease (:mpra) (and whieh is the 
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majority rule), plaintiff has failed to trace any of Miss 
Frye ',s funds into property or assets of the receivership 
estate, but contra has shown that if the funds found their 
way into the time certificates of deposit, a:ll such certi-
ficates had been cashed and the proceells expended prior 
to the appointment of the receiver. Hence, the so-called 
"trust fund" failed when the means of tracing it failed. 
His right to follow his alleged ''trust funds'' failed with 
proof that none of the ceriifica tes of deposit reached the 
receiver's hands. The certificates were the end of his 
trail. He made no proof that any of Miss Frye's funds 
were a part of the cash funds of the compan~, which the 
receiver admits it received. His proof was directetl 
towards the certificates of deposit and when his trail 
ran blind he cannot now retrace his steps in the direction 
of the undeposited cash funds of the company which the 
receiver secured on its appointment. Neither can the 
plaintiff point to the general assets of the company (of 
which the cash funds were a part) and elaim a preferreJ 
lien thereon because he has no claim on the general 
assets (other than that of a common creditor) upon his 
failure to identify his alleged "trust funds" either in 
its original or transmuted form. 
CONCLUSION. 
From the foregoing discussion t~he following eon-
elusions logicaHy foUows: 
I. 
The plaintiff, Walker, as assig-nee of Alice Frye, be-
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came but a common creditor of Walker Brothers Dry 
Goods Company and he remained a common creditor at 
all times. HiR orders to the company concerning the 
'balance of the Alice 11-,rye account did not change this 
credit balance into a trust fund nor constitute the com-
pany trustee and himself cestui que trust. 
II. 
The funds paid by Alice ]~rye to the company were 
intermingled and confused in the genera'l assets of the 
company and the plaintiff utterly failed to trace these 
funds into any asset or property coming into the hands 
of the receiver; hence his trust fa,iled and he is relegated 
to the position of common Cl'(~ditor without preference. 
In cousideration of the foregoing it is submitted 
that the judgment in this case should be reversed, with 
instructions to the trial court to enter judgment adjudi-
cating that plaintiff is but a common creditor without 
preference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RITER & COW AN, 
WILSON McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant.· 
